
The United States believed that deeper trade with China would lead to a more open, market-driven economy and political reform, for the benefit of all. That belief drove U.S. trade policy across both parties.
Told through five expert voices who documented the rise and consequences of the China trade relationship from five distinct and compelling perspectives.
Harvard economist Dani Rodrik warned that deep economic integration, national sovereignty, and democratic accountability cannot coexist — and that pursuing rapid trade liberalization without building enforcement institutions would create instability. This was the intellectual warning that went unheeded.
Bob Davis, a longtime Wall Street Journal reporter, spoke with officials from every U.S. administration since the Cold War. He shows how engagement with China shifted from a strategic move to win allies against the Soviets to a trade policy driven by corporate interests. Washington focused on exports and profits—and overlooked warning signs about China's authoritarian model and state control of its economy.
Robert Lighthizer, former U.S. Trade Representative, calls China's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) a historic mistake. China made promises to open its economy—but didn't keep them. Instead, it used WTO rules to its advantage while continuing to subsidize industries, control capital, and pressure companies for technology. Bob Davis confirms that many U.S. officials were surprised when liberal reforms never came. This was exactly the kind of institutional failure Rodrik had predicted.
MIT economist David Autor studied what actually happened after China joined the WTO. His research shows that U.S. manufacturing regions were devastated. Over 2 million jobs were lost, mostly in areas that never recovered. This wasn't just "creative destruction"—it led to long-term unemployment, falling wages, and rising social problems like opioid addiction and political distrust. Policymakers had no plan for how to respond.
As offshoring to China expanded, U.S. companies helped block tougher enforcement. Davis shows how business groups pressured Washington to stay quiet. Meanwhile, Bethany Allen, an investigative journalist, documents how China used its market power to silence critics—pressuring Hollywood, tech firms, and even sports leagues to avoid sensitive topics. The result: American companies became entangled in China's political agenda.
Lighthizer argues that the WTO and traditional trade tools couldn't handle China's model of state-led capitalism. Allen shows that democratic countries, including the U.S., failed to coordinate a real response—even as China became more aggressive abroad. Davis captures the regret of officials who saw the problem but couldn't get ahead of it. Everyone knew the system wasn't working—but no one fixed it. This was precisely the trilemma Rodrik described — trade outpacing governance.
Higher tariffs on Chinese goods; updated steel and aluminum duties; tighter export controls and new screening of outbound investment; curbs on duty-free small-parcel imports; and CHIPS-funded projects alongside renewed private investment—mark a clear shift. The presidency is securing foreign-investment commitments and industry is organizing—momentum, not orchestration. The second- and third-order effects will take time to appear and won't always be predictable. Lighthizer calls for a protective industrial plan; Autor for an innovation-led public–private buildout; Allen for allied coordination against coercion; Davis puts the epitaph on The China Bet, declaring that the engagement era is over. These course corrections are beginning to address what Rodrik identified decades earlier.
Five distinguished voices who have documented the rise and consequences of the China trade relationship from five distinct and compelling perspectives.




